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†

In response to Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006).
In his provocative and insightful article, The Doctrinal Unity of Alter1
native Liability and Market-Share Liability, Professor Mark Geistfeld proffers several interesting theses about market-share liability, causation,
and evidence. Three of the more moderate theses are:
2

(1) Cases like Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories need not be understood as
supplanting causation-based liability with risk-creation liability.
(2) Evidentiary considerations in fact played a leading role in Sindell,
and, if properly interpreted, could explain both Sindell and certain forms
of market-share liability in a manner that fully retains traditional causation notion rules, and does not depend on any novel risk-creation principles.
(3) The rationale underlying Sindell and certain forms of market-share
liability shares a great deal with the principles underlying Summers v.
3
Tice, which is regarded as quite uncontroversial.

I agree with all three of these theses. Indeed, I, along with Professor Arthur Ripstein, defended these claims about Sindell, Summers,
market-share liability, and alternative liability several years ago, in an
4
article from which Professor Geistfeld quotes approvingly. Professor
Geistfeld goes well beyond the claims in that article, however, advancing a proposal that is far reaching in its implications for law revision,
and profound in its theoretical import.
Geistfeld’s project, in broad form, is to bring together a variety of
different bases for joint and several liability that operate by means of
†
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155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006).
2
607 P.2d 924, 938 (Cal. 1980) (constructing and imposing market-share liability
on manufacturers of the drug DES).
3
199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding that defendants, who had each negligently
fired shotguns in the plaintiff’s direction and injured him, were each presumed to have
caused injury, and therefore held to be jointly liable).
4
See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 461 & n.38, 467 n.54, 484 n.102 (citing Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001)).
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5

what he calls “evidential grouping,” without indulging a joint agency
theory or a risk-contribution theory. These include, in the first instance: the alternative liability of Summers v. Tice and the market-share
liability of cases such as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, as well as the special concurrent causation rules both in the classic two-fire case of
6
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway, and con7
temporary cases involving multiple contributing toxic tortfeasors; and
only somewhat less directly, in group res ipsa cases such as Ybarra v.
8
Spangard. The principle most clearly expressed in the alternative liability case of Summers v. Tice, according to Geistfeld, is the principle
of evidential grouping—in basic form it explains the rationale underlying all of these cases:
Once the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) each defendant may have tortiously caused the harm, (2) one or
more of the defendants did actually cause the harm, and (3) each defendant would be subject to liability for having actually caused or contributed to the harm, then no defendant can avoid liability by relying
upon the tortious conduct of the other defendants, when that form of
exculpatory causal proof would enable all of the defendants to avoid liability.
To invoke this principle, the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden
of proving that each defendant is responsible for a tortious risk that may
have actually caused or contributed to the harm. In order for this proof
to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie case, each defendant must also be
subject to liability in the event that her tortious conduct actually caused
or contributed to the harm. With respect to the element of causation,
the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden of proof against the group
9
of defendants.

Geistfeld seems not to appreciate just how broad this principle is.
Consider the following hypothetical:

5

Id. at 453.
179 N.W. 45, 48-49 (Minn. 1920) (holding that a defendant who starts a fire that
combines with other fires is liable for any destruction of property caused by the combined fire if plaintiff can show that defendant’s fire was a material element in the
property’s destruction).
7
See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 459 (Md. 1992) (“[T]he
failure to warn on the part of any one supplier of an asbestos product to which a decedent was exposed can operate as a concurrent proximate cause with the failures to
warn on the part of other such suppliers.”).
8
154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945) (applying an extended form of res ipsa loquitur to justify imposition of joint and several liability upon all members of a group of medical
personnel present at and involved in plaintiff-patient’s surgery when plaintiff-patient in
their care sustains an injury while unconscious).
9
Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 469 (footnote omitted).
6
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Between 11:00 and 11:15 p.m. on Sunday, July 22, Robert Lupin was working at a construction site on the highway, quite near the entrance to a bridge crossing. Prominently posted signs indicated a reduced speed limit (25 mph, from 55
mph) and additional prominent signs warned that the fines for speeding in this
work zone were doubled. However, virtually all of the cars on the road were traveling between 50-60 mph. Lupin needed to cross a lane in the construction zone
and waited until another worker signaled for the traffic to stop, but a dark sedan
nevertheless almost hit him (apparently not noticing him). Lupin jumped out of
the way, landing on an oil slick. He fell on his face, breaking several teeth and
his arm. The traffic did not stop for a few minutes.
Using video cameras around the toll-booth area, Lupin’s personal injury lawyer can identify forty dark sedans that were speeding significantly during the window of time that Lupin was injured, consistent with where he was injured. He
can therefore prove that each of these drivers “is responsible for a tortious risk that
may have actually caused or contributed to the harm.”

This is also a scenario in which “(1) each defendant may have tortiously caused the harm, (2) one or more of the defendants did actually cause the harm, and (3) each defendant would be subject to liabil10
ity for having actually caused or contributed to the harm.” None of
these defendants would be able to exculpate himself by saying, “it was
not me, it was one of the other dark sedans.” According to Geistfeld’s
principle, there should be rebuttable joint and several liability for
each of the forty drivers. Each should be liable to Lupin unless the
driver can prove that she was not involved.
Three points should be made about this hypothetical. First, this is
not a fanciful or unrealistic case. In cases involving automobile accidents, defective products, or even in excessive force cases against police officers, it is the personal injury lawyer’s mundane reality that tortfeasor identification can be very difficult. And this is true even where
it is possible to produce evidence of widespread tortious risk creation
or tortious conduct, and even where it is possible for the plaintiff to
circumscribe the potential causative agent to some degree.
Second, under current law there would not be not liability in this
case or cases like it; therefore, Geistfeld’s account from a descriptive
or interpretive point of view is not plausible. In both this hypothetical
11
and the throngs of cases like it, there is no liability in our system.
10

Id.
“A fundamental principle of traditional products liability law is that the plaintiff
must prove that the defendants supplied the product which caused the injury.” Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. 1989); see also Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d
496, 506-08 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting civil rights claim in which State actor who committed wrongful conduct against plaintiff was not identified); Rodrigues v. Gen. Elec.
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 975, 976 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that failure to establish the
fan causing plaintiff’s injury was made by defendant—and failure to rebut evidence to
11
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Summers, Sindell, and Ybarra are exceptional: “zebras,” as medical resi12
dents call them, not “horses.” Overwhelmingly, cases factually similar
to the Lupin hypothetical are not brought. A plaintiff’s lawyer who
has no more information than that which I gave in the Lupin hypothetical will abandon the case or choose to sue the Bridge and Tunnel
Authority (perhaps preferring to attempt to prove duty or fault) and
avoid an unbridgeable gap in causation. And so it is that civil rights
lawyers sue police departments and cities for what is really an individual’s act, products liability lawyers caught in such a bind sue industries
rather than just manufacturers, and personal injury lawyers sue landowners, not perpetrators.
Third—and here is the core of this Response—the arguments
made from a normative point of view for the principle of evidential
grouping are unsound. Geistfeld offers three: (a) a defendant may
not shelter herself from liability by claiming a right to a procedural
rule that favors her, if that rule is unfair; (b) defendants who reject
evidence-based liability are taking mutually inconsistent positions; and
(c) defendants who reject evidence-based liability are relying upon
13
naked statistics in an unacceptable way.
(a) Unfair Procedural Rules: It is of course true at some level that a
defendant may not avail herself of the benefits of an unfair procedural
rule. But what counts as unfair, and why? Geistfeld himself argues
persuasively against the most popular, hornbook-style move in this
scenario, which is to argue that it is only fair that the wrongful actor
should bear the risk of evidentiary uncertainty. That principle is unthe contrary—undercut plaintiff’s claim); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co.,
226 S.W.3d 110, 115-17 (Mo. 2007) (rejecting lead paint action in which plaintiffs
could not identify particular defendants causing particular damage). The lure of
Summers’s reasoning—and the version of the reasoning that Geistfeld depicts—is undoubtedly powerful. Indeed, the courts that routinely reject cases on the ground of
inadequate tortfeasor identification frequently make a point of distinguishing Summers.
See, e.g., Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ civil rights claim against fourteen officers where there was no way to identify
which officer stole plaintiffs’ items from the search scene, and reasoning that there was
no evidence that each of them acted wrongfully, only that one of them did). More
generally, Dobbs’s treatise sets out a broad array of limitations on Summers. See DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 175, at 428-29 (2000). To see Summers as the rule—
doctrinally—and everything else as exceptions is to miss the forest for the trees. Geistfeld’s article does not make this error; its point is that the law should move to realize
the principle of evidential grouping, not that it has done so.
12
“When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras,” goes the medical residents’ maxim (meaning, roughly, that it is prudent to attribute symptoms to ordinary
causes rather than exceptional ones).
13
See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 461, 466-68.
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tenably broad, Geistfeld argues, because it would swamp all cases in
which the proof of fault was strong but the proof of causation was
14
weak.
Geistfeld needs to move beyond the word “unfair” and provide either: (i) a normative account of what makes certain attributes of a
procedural and evidentiary system fair and others unfair; or (ii) a basis
for cabining the fairness intuition that is so powerfully felt in Summers
and Sindell so that it can drive intuitively satisfactory outcomes in some
settings, without entirely overtaking the principle that a defendant
who caused no harm cannot be held liable for harm; or (iii) an account of why particular features of Summers, Sindell, and other cases
where courts have shifted the burden of proof on tortfeasor identification, render it particularly justifiable from a normative point of view to
alter the evidentiary and procedural framework, and why these features are present in a wider array of settings than has generally been
recognized. Because Geistfeld provides none of the above, the “un15
fairness” argument is more rhetoric than substance.
(b) Inconsistency: Geistfeld does not rest on “unfairness” alone; instead, he offers an interesting argument that defendants in “evidential
grouping” cases cannot consistently maintain their view. Here is his
argument:
The plaintiff’s evidence shows that she was injured by the group of
defendant tortfeasors, and that each defendant is a member of that
group. Unless a defendant rebuts this evidence, she cannot reasonably
deny that the plaintiff was harmed by one of the defendants, including
herself. The defendant, therefore, cannot avoid liability merely by arguing that
the other defendants, more likely than not, caused the harm, if that same argument would enable every other defendant to avoid liability. In these circumstances, the defendant’s argument effectively denies that the plaintiff was
harmed by any of the defendants, including herself, even though the defendant’s
failure to rebut the plaintiff’s proof disables the defendant from denying liability
14

See id. at 456-58.
To be sure, fact patterns like Summers and Sindell move judges and scholars to
ask the larger question of whether the causation requirement of negligence law (and,
to a great extent, tort law more generally) is itself fair. This is a question I will not address here, both because it is part of Geistfeld’s own project to justify evidential grouping and a broader form of market-share liability without jettisoning the causation requirement and because I have addressed the defensibility and fairness of requiring
causation in several other articles. See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 221-22, 22931; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 93
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (replying to criticism that tort law’s causation
requirement unfairly permits luck to carry too much weight in determining liability);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625,
1636–60 (2002) (arguing that tort does not permit recovery absent injury, and providing justification for this requirement).
15
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on this basis. To avoid this inconsistency, the defendant can only rely
16
upon proof rebutting the plaintiff’s evidence.

The argument is unsound because it depends upon an ambiguity
in the modifier “effectively” in the clause, “the defendant’s argument
effectively denies that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defendants.” “Effectively” can be used to suggest a practical equivalence or
to suggest an equivalence in semantic content, and Geistfeld’s short
argument that there is an inconsistency in the defendant’s position relies upon an equivocation between these two. If the clause is intended
to convey that the defendant’s argument “has the same practical consequences” as denying that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defendants, then it is true to say that the argument “effectively denies” it.
But there is no actual inconsistency in making a statement that leads
to the same practical consequences as an outright denial would.
There is no contradiction. Of course, if “effectively” in the phrase “effectively denies” is intended to connote “in essence denies” or “really
denies” or “in meaning denies” or “not in so many words denies,” then
we are in a different situation. If it is accurate that the defendant is
really denying that the plaintiff was harmed by one of the defendants,
then (given the earlier part of Geistfeld’s paragraph), the defendant is
in fact contradicting himself. But the problem with Geistfeld’s argument is that the defendant is not really denying that the plaintiff was
harmed by one of the defendants. The defendant is denying that
plaintiff can identify which particular defendant harmed her, and is
asserting that proof of injurer identity is a sine qua non of recovery.
There is no inconsistency here.
(c) Naked Statistics: Geistfeld’s most intriguing argument is the following:
[W]hen every defendant attempts to avoid liability by relying upon the
negligence of other defendants, they are resorting to “naked statistics”
rather than particularistic proof, but “[j]udges generally have refused to
accept naked statistics or ex ante causal probabilities as evidence of what
actually happened on a particular occasion.” The fact that the remaining group of defendants probably caused the injury does not explain
what happened in this particular case, as it implies that no defendant
caused the harm, and yet the plaintiff has provided uncontested proof to
17
the contrary.

16

Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis added).
Id. at 467-68 (footnote omitted) (quoting Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying
the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050-51 (1988)).
17
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Four concerns emerge here, however. First, Geistfeld’s language
in this paragraph is mostly descriptive and doctrinal, rather than normative or explanatory. However, on a descriptive front, as I have argued, it is quite clear that judges do not generally accept such “evidential grouping” claims.
Second, naked statistics are deemed unacceptable if they are used
to support one of the allegations that establish liability. However, discussion of naked statistics being used to establish the plaintiff’s case is
misplaced. Rather, the real inquiry is determining what evidence
would undermine the plaintiff’s case. Perhaps more importantly, we
are discussing whether the burden on a plaintiff to put forward a
prima facie case should include a requirement of identifying a defendant tortfeasor. If anything, the ban on naked statistics to uphold
what looks like a flimsy case on causation would seem to cut in favor of
defendants, not against them. Geistfeld seems to have forgotten that
he is offering the naked statistics argument as an effort to justify the
principle of evidential grouping, not as an argument over what would
rebut a plaintiff’s claim, were the principle so accepted.
Third, even if we assume that a plaintiff has a prima facie case, it is
not obvious why a court’s disinclination to permit naked statistics on
the liability-establishing front is a reason to reject naked statistics on
the defendants’ side. The literature on naked statistics is notoriously
elusive and undertheorized, and it is simply not clear why limits on
exculpation should parallel limits on inculpation.
Finally, and perhaps most simply, is this really use of naked statistics? The case has not seriously been made that a defendant’s efforts
to exculpate herself by pointing out that many others were similarly
situated (and that plaintiff has not linked her tortiousness to the
plaintiff’s injury) actually constitutes an effort to establish a fact by use
of naked statistics. It seems, rather, to be merely a means of emphasizing the underspecified nature of the evidence that the plaintiff has offered against her.
The basic shortcoming of Geistfeld’s “principle of evidential
grouping” is that he mistakes the question his analysis yields for the
answer to that question. The categories that he so suggestively brings
together are indeed illustrations of a basic phenomenon: Due to the
frequent difficulties plaintiffs encounter in identifying any individual
tortious agent who can be shown to have been a but-for cause of the
injury, a plaintiff’s lawyer will often take aim at a category of parties
who may have tortiously caused the injury. Moreover, in all of these
cases, good lawyers, judges, and ordinary jurors are drawn to the idea
of finessing the problem by shifting the burden of proof to the whole
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group of defendants. Yet Geistfeld (like Ripstein, myself, and the
overwhelming majority of courts) takes as basic, both interpretively
and normatively, that a defendant cannot be held liable for a plaintiff’s injury merely for creating the risk of injury; rather, the defendant
must have actually caused the injury. Moreover, Geistfeld does not believe that courts can simply assert an Orwellian redefinition of words:
he believes that the set of procedural and evidentiary standards that
courts set up to adjudicate causation must, while displaying a sense of
pragmatism and fairness, nevertheless take seriously the idea that a defendant should not be liable to a plaintiff unless that defendant
18
caused plaintiff’s injury. Finally, in all of these cases, although it
would circumvent the tortfeasor identification problem if one could
plausibly depict factual or legal connections among the parties that
would justify treating the group as a single, unified agent, for purposes
of attributing responsibility, the facts are just not there to justify unified agency conceptualization.
The question that Geistfeld’s synthesis invites is, therefore: Given
that the conditions he sets forth for evidential grouping are themselves insufficient to justify the creation of rebuttable joint and several liability, what makes
evidential grouping permissible in these different doctrinal areas?
Some of the answers are quite clear at this stage. Concurrent causation cases challenge—correctly, in my view (and that of most tort
scholars)—the underlying assumption that but-for causation is truly a
conceptual requirement of actual causation with regard to a narrow
19
band of cases. Group res ipsa cases, such as Ybarra, remain controversial with regard to their acceptability, but there is less mystery about
what drives them normatively: a combination of policy motivations intended to break a code of silence among interconnected defendants
who close out access to evidence, and lingering doubts about whether
some type of group agency theory really should apply. This cluster of
judicial motivations was palpably at work in a more contemporary case
from Indiana. Shepard ex rel. Shepard v. Porter involved a group of four
friends walking behind the plaintiff, one of whom lit the plaintiff’s
20
pants on fire, causing serious injury. The plaintiff was unable to
identify which one did it, and none of the boys volunteered this information pre-trial; the court understandably preferred to force the
18

See id. at 469.
See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1792-93
(1985) (arguing that courts’ deviation from but-for causation standard in concurrent
causation case is best interpreted as hinging on analysis of causation).
20
679 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
19
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information out at trial, rather than rewarding their evident pact of
21
silence.
Geistfeld is right to pick market-share liability as a subdomain in
which theorizing remains highly contested, and right to pick alternative liability as its closest cousin. Moreover, the conditions for the applicability of market-share liability is a particularly timely topic, given
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent decision to permit marketshare liability (which it calls “risk-contribution theory”) in the domain
22
of liability for lead-based paint. And, of course, the plaintiffs in Sin23
dell advocated the adoption of alternative liability from Summers.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court in Sindell expressly re24
jected alternative liability, and Geistfeld never takes seriously its reasons for doing so.
By contrast, Arthur Ripstein and I offered an explanation that ac25
commodates both the similarities and the differences of the two.
Summers works because the defendant’s right is a right to be free of liability where he did not cause the plaintiff’s injury, and respecting
that right is inconsistent with imposing liability where it is more likely
than not that the defendant caused no injury to the plaintiff. But that
leaves open the question, we argued, of what should happen in equipoise, where the probability is exactly fifty percent. It is therefore
permissible for the court to adopt rebuttable joint and several liability
in the two-person Summers (the real Summers), but not in any more ex26
tended version.
21

See id. at 1389.
Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562 (Wis. 2005) (holding
that “risk-contribution theory” developed in DES context is applicable to products liability actions based on lead-based paint, notwithstanding substantial differences in
product and context). As the Thomas court recognized, the overwhelming majority of
courts facing this question have rejected market-share liability for lead-based paint. See,
e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 115-17 (Mo. 2007).
23
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980).
24
See id. at 930-31.
25
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 243-44.
26
One might object to our analysis—that we too readily adopt the artifice of the
court in Summers, that the chance is exactly fifty percent as to each defendant that he
committed a “completed” tort of negligence (rather than an inchoate, or unrealized
tort). After all, one might add, the evidence behind each of the other elements of the
claim—especially breach—establishes the element by a preponderance, but perhaps
somewhat less than one hundred percent. However, if one were really to abstract away
from the artificial framing of the problem in Summers, one might then reject the stipulation of the parties that both pellets came from the same shotgun. If one pellet came
from each, then there would have been a completed tort by each defendant, and the
dispute would only be about damages—a much easier case. Indeed, in a case remarkably similar to Summers, but plainly involving only one hit (a single bullet) coming
22
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Sindell does not work under the Summers rationale, nor does mar27
ket-share liability more generally, we argued. However, so long as
the court has before it as parties a domain of plaintiffs and defendants
large enough to ensure that each defendant has in fact tortiously injured a share of the plaintiffs before the court, then liability is really
being imposed for injuries tortiously caused, not simply for tortious
risk creation. The form of market-share liability created and applied
by the California Supreme Court in Sindell fits that analysis perfectly,
but is peculiar to the constraints of that analysis.
Geistfeld’s article pushes harder than anyone has done thus far on
questions about evidential grouping. For the reasons articulated, I do
not think he has made out the case that all or even most factual scenarios falling under the conditions he enumerates qualify for such
grouping, and I do not think that case can be made. However, there
may indeed be more types of evidential grouping that are permissible,
there may be interconnections among those so far developed, and
there may be as yet unearthed reasons underlying the superficially discrete categories. Those questions remain to be answered, but Geistfeld is to be credited with forcing us to ask them.
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from one of two hunters, a Minnesota appellate court rejected liability. See Leuer v.
Johnson, 450 N.W.2d 363, 364-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
27
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 243-44.

